In this work, a new method for cognitive action selection is formally introduced, keeping into consideration an individual bias for the agents: ego biased learning. It allows the agents to adapt their behaviour according to a payoff coming from the action they performed at time t-1, by converting an action pattern into a synthetic value, updated at each time, but keeping into account their individual preferences towards specific actions. In agent based simulations, the many entities involved usually deal with an action selection based on the reactive paradigm: they usually feature embedded strategies to be used according to the stimuli coming from the environment or other entities. The actors involved in real Social Systems have a local vision and usually can only see their own actions or neighbours' ones (bounded rationality) and sometimes they could be biased towards a particular behaviour, even if not optimal for a certain situation. Some simulations are run, in order to show the effects of biases, when dealing with an heterogeneous population of agents.
INTRODUCTION
Multi agent models allow to capture the complexity by modeling the system from the bottom, by defining the agents' behavior and the rules of interaction among them and the environment. Agent Based Simulation (ABS), in this field, is not only about understanding the individual behavior of agents, or in optimizing the interaction among them, in order to coordinate their actions to reach a common goal, like in other Multi Agent Systems (MAS), but above all it's about re-creating a real social system (e.g.: a market, an enterprise, a biological system) in order to analyze it as if it were a virtual laboratory for experiments. Reactive agents or cognitive ones can be employed in multi agent systems (Remondino, 2005) ; while the former model deals with the stimulus-reaction paradigm, the latter provides a "mind" for the agents, that can decide which action to take at the next step, based on their previous actions and the state of the world. When dealing with the problem of action selection, reactive agents simply feature a wired behavior, deriving from some conditional embedded rules that cannot be changed by the circumstances, and must be foreseen and wired into them by the model designer. For example given a set of agent's states , , and a set of agent's actions , , a deterministic reactive agent could consist of a set of rules like:
Or, if we have a wider set of states , … , , with , but again just a binary set of actions to be performed , , the rule could be as follows:
, ;
Where "range" is used to synthetically indicate the states among 1 and k, in the system. This can be applied in the same way with several discrete intervals, instead of just two. Of course, if the actions are more than two, like a set , … , , the rules can be simply multiplied as follows:
And linear combinations of both sets. The state of the agent could be function of both a stimulus coming from the environment and of some action performed by other agents or by the agent itself.
Reactive agents could also be stochastic, in the sense that they could have a probabilistic distribution connected to their action selection function. For each action/state combination a probability function is defined, so that for a defined and a defined we have that:
, where 0 1
And , 1
As an example we may think of a simple situation in which we have two possible actions , so that for a particular state we could have that , 0.2 and that , 0.8, meaning that the agent, when facing the state will perform 20% of the times the action and 80% of the times action , using a uniform distribution.
Some actions could feature a probability of 0 for certain states, and others could have a probability of 1 for a given state. If all the probabilities for the actions, given a state, are either 0 or 1, we are back at the deterministic situation presented above since, in that particular case, only one action could be performed (probability equal to 1) while the others would never be performed (probability equal to 0).
Reactive agents can be good for simulations, since the results obtained by employing them are usually easily readable and comparable (especially for ceteris paribus analysis). Besides, when the agent's behavior is not the primary focus, reactive agents, if their rules are properly chosen, can give very interesting aggregate results, often letting emergent system properties emerge at a macro level. Though, in situations in which, for example, learning coordination is important, or the focus is on exploring different behaviors in order to dynamically choose the best one for a given state, or simply agent's behavior is the principal topic of the research, cognitive agents could be employed, embedded with some learning technique. Besides, if the rules of a reactive agent are not chosen properly, they could bias the results; these rules, in fact, are chosen by the designer and could thus reflect her own opinions about the modeled system. Since many ABS of social systems can formulated as stage games with simultaneous moves made by the agents, some learning techniques derived from this field can be embedded into them, in order to create more realistic response to the external stimuli, by endowing the agents with a self adapting ability. Though, multi-agent learning is more challenging than singleagent, because of two complementary reasons. Treating the multiple agents as a single agent increases the state and action spaces exponentially and is thus unusable in multi agent simulation, where so many entities act at the same time. On the other hand, treating the other agents as part of the environment makes the environment non-stationary and non-Markovian (Mataric, 1997) . In particular, ABS are non-Markovian systems if seen from the point of view of the agents (since the new state is not only function of the individual agent's action, but of the aggregate actions of all the agents) and thus traditional Q-learning algorithms (Watkins, 1989; Sutton and Barto, 1998 ) cannot be used effectively: the actors involved in real Social Systems have a local vision and usually can only see their own actions or neighbours' ones (bounded rationality) and, above all, the resulting state is function of the aggregate behaviours, and not of the individual ones.
While, as discussed in Powers and Shoham (2005) , in iterated games learning is derived from facing the same opponent (or another one, with the same goals), in social systems the subjects can be different and the payoff could not be a deterministic or stochastic value coming from a payoff matrix. More realistically, in social systems the payoff could be a value coming from the dynamics of interaction among many entities and the environment, and could have different values, not necessarily within a predefined scale. Besides, social models are not all and only about coordination, like iterated games, and agents could have a bias towards a particular behavior, preferring it even if that's not the best of the possible ones. An example from the real world could be the adoption of a technological innovation in a company: even though it can be good for the enterprise to adopt it, the managerial board could be biased and could have a bad attitude towards technology, perceiving a risk which is higher than the real one. Thus, even by looking at the positive figures coming from market studies and so on, they could decide not to adopt it. This is something which is not taken into consideration by traditional learning methods, but that should be considered in ABS of social systems, where agents are often supposed to mimic some human behavior. Besides, when the agents are connected through a social network, the experience behind a specific action could be shared with others, and factors like the individual reputation of other agents could be an important bias to individual perception. In order to introduce these factors, a formal method is presented in the paper: Ego Biased Learning (EBL). Another paradigm is briefly described as a future development, called Reputation Based Socially Biased Learning.
The purpose of this work is not that of supplying an optimized algorithm for reinforcement learning (RL); instead, the presented formalisms mimic as much as possible the real cognitive process taken by human agents involved in a social complex system, when needing to take an individual strategic decision; this is useful to study aggregate results.
REINFORCEMENT LEARNING
Learning from reinforcements has received substantial attention as a mechanism for robots and other computer systems to learn tasks without external supervision. The agent typically receives a positive payoff from the environment after it achieves a particular goal, or, even simpler, when a performed action gives good results. In the same way, it receives a negative (or null) payoff when the action (or set of actions) performed brings to a failure. By performing many actions overtime (trial and error technique), the agents can compute the expected values (EV) for each action. According to Sutton and Barto (1998) this paradigm turns values into behavioral patterns; in fact, each time an action will need to be performed, its EV, will be considered and compared with the EVs of other possible actions, thus determining the agent's behavior, which is not wired into the agent itself, but self adapting to the system in which it operates. Most RL algorithms are about coordination in multi agents systems, defined as the ability of two or more agents to jointly reach a consensus over which actions to perform in an environment. In these cases, an algorithm derived from the classic Q-Learning technique (Watkins, 1989) can be used. The EV for an action --is simply updated every time the action is performed, according to the following, reported by Kapetanakis and Kundenko (2004) : (6) Where 0 1 is the learning rate and p is the payoff received every time that action a is performed. This is particularly suitable for simulating multi stage games (Fudenberg and Levine 1998) , in which agents must coordinate to get the highest possible aggregate payoff. For example, given a scenario with two agents (A and B), each of them endowed with two possible actions , and , respectively, the agents will get a payoff, based on a payoff matrix, according to the combination of performed actions. For instance, if and are performed at the same time, both agents will get a positive payoff, while for all the other combinations they will receive a negative reward.
Modifications of the (6) have been introduced to make the converging process faster and more efficient under these conditions.
Learning and Social Simulation
ABS applied to social system is not necessarily about coordination among agents and convergence to the optimal behaviour, especially when focusing on the aggregate level; it's often more important to have a realistic behaviour for the agents, in the sense that it should replicate, as much as possible, that of real individuals.
The aforementioned RL algorithm analytically evaluates the best action based on historical data, i.e.: the EV of the action itself, over time. This makes the agent perfectly rational, since it will evaluate, every time he has to perform it, the best possible action found till then. If this is very useful for computational problems where convergence to an optimal behaviour is important, it's not realistic when applied to a simulation of a social system. In this kind of systems, learning should keep into account the human factor, in the shape of perception biases, preferences, prejudice, external influences and so on. When a human (or an organization driven by humans) faces an alternative, the past results, though important for evaluation, are just one of the many components behind the action selection process. As an example we could think of the innovation adoption process; while a technological innovation could provide money savings and improved life style, it often spreads much slower than it should. This is due mainly to the resistance to innovation, typical of many human beings. If the humans worked in the same way as expressed with equation (6), then an innovation bringing even the smallest saving should be adopted immediately.
Another effective example is to be found in social systems; when deciding which action to perform, humans are usually biased by the opinion of their neighbours (e.g.: friends, colleagues, ad so on). This means that their individual experience is important, but not the only driver behind the action to perform, while other variables are considered and should be introduced in the evaluation process, when dealing with a simulation of a social system, in order to improve the realism of the model and to focus on aggregate results.
Traditional learning models can't represent individualities in a social system, or else they represented all of them in the same way -i.e.: as focused and rational agents; since they ignore many other aspects of behaviour that influence how humans make decisions in real life, these models do not accurately represent real users in social contexts.
EGO BIASED LEARNING
While discussing the cognitive link among preferences and choices is definitely beyond the purpose of this work, it's important to notice that it's commonly accepted that the mentioned aspects are strictly linked among them. The link is actually bidirectional (Chen, 2008) , meaning that human preferences influence choices, but in turn the performed actions (consequent to choices) can change original preferences.
As stated in Sharot et al. (2009) Even if preferences can be modified according to the outcome of past actions (and this is well represented by the RL algorithms described before), humans can keep an emotional part driving them to prefer a certain action over another one, even when the latter has proven better than the former. Some of these can be simply wired into the DNA, or could have formed in many years and thus being hardly modifiable. A bias is defined as "a particular tendency or inclination, esp. one that prevents unprejudiced consideration of a question; prejudice" (www.dictionary.com). That's the point behind learning: human aren't machines, able to analytically evaluate all the aspects of a problem and, above all, the payoff deriving from an action is filtered by their own perceptions. There's more than just a selfupdating function for evaluating actions and in the following a formal RL method is presented, keeping into consideration a bias towards a particular action, which, to some extents, make it preferable to another one that would analytically prove. EBL allows to keep this personal factor into consideration, when applying a RL paradigm to agents.
In the first formulation, a dualistic action selection is considered, i.e.:
, . By applying the formal reinforcement learning technique described in equation (6) an agent is able to have the expected value for the action it performed. Each agent is endowed with the RL technique. At this point, we can imagine two different categories of agents ( , : one biased towards action and the other one biased towards action . For each category, a constant is introduced (0 , 1 , defining the propensity for the given action, used to evaluate and which is the expected value of the action, corrected by the bias. For the category of agents biased towards action we have that:
In this way, represents the propensity for the first category of agents towards action and acts as a percentage increasing the analytically computed and decreasing . At the same way, would represent the propensity for the second category of agents towards action and acts on the expected value of the two possible actions as before:
The constant acts like a "friction" for the EV function; after calculating the objective it increments it of a percentage, if is the action for which the agent has a positive bias, or decrements it, if is the action for which the agent has a negative bias. In this way, the agent will perform action (instead of ) even if , as long as is not less than . In particular, by analytically solving the following:
We have that agent (biased towards action ) will perform as long as: is negative, then will obviously be performed (being this a sub-case of equation 10), while if is positive and is negative, then will be performed, since even if biased, it wouldn't make any sense for an agent to perform an action that proved even harmful (that's why it went down to a negative value). If , by definition, the performed action will be the favorite one, i.e.: the one towards which the agent has a positive bias.
In order to give a numeric example, if 50 and 0.2 then will be performed by agent till 75. This friction gets even stronger for higher K values; for example, with a 0.5, will be performed till 150 and so on. In figure 1 , a chart is shown with the various resulting , calculated according to equation 8, for agent , given . When compared to the baseline results ( 0) it's evident that by increasing the value of , the positive values of turns into higher and higher values of . At the same time, a negative value of gets less and less negative by increasing , while never turning into a positive value (at most, when , gets equal to 0 for every 0). For example, with 0.1, is 10% higher than . for agent given , for various
In figure 2 , a chart is shown with the various resulting , calculated according to equation 8, for agent , given . This time, when compared to the baseline result ( 0), since is the action towards which the agent has a negative bias, it's possible to notice that the resulting is always lower (or equal, in case they are both 0) than the original calculated according to equation 6. In particular, higher corresponds to more bias (larger distance among the objective expected value), exactly opposite as it was before for action . Note that for a 1 (i.e.: maximum bias) never gets past zero, so that is performed if and only if -and hence -is less than zero.
General Cases
The first general case (more than two possible actions and more than two categories of agents) is actually a strict super-case of the one formalized in 3.1. Each agent is endowed with an evaluation biased function derived from equations (7). Be , , … , the set of agents, and , , … , the set of possible actions to be performed, then the specific agent , with a positive bias for action will feature such a biased evaluation function:
In case that two or more EV a have the same value, the agent will perform the action towards which it has a positive bias; in the case explored by equation (12), in which the agent has the same positive bias towards more than one action, then the choice among which action to perform, under the same EV a , could be managed in various ways (e.g.: randomly, stochastically and so on).
As a last general case, the agents could be a different positive/negative propensity towards different actions. In this case, the variable to be used won't be the same for all the equations regarding an individual agent. For example, given a set of , , … , and a set of actions , , … , , for each agent ( we have: Besides being a fixed parameter, K could be a stochastic value, e.g.: given a mean and a variance.
SIMULATED EXPERIMENTS
Some experiments were done in order to text the basic EBL equations introduced in paragraph 3.1. The agents involved in the simulation can perform two possible actions, and . The agents in the simulation randomly meet at each turn (one to one) and perform an action according to their EV. A payoff matrix is used, in the form of: Where is the payoff originated when both agents perform , is the payoff given to the agents when one of them performs and the other one performs and so on. Usually and are set at the same value, for coherency. For each time-step in the simulation, the number of agents performing and are sampled and represented on a graph. 
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The first baseline experiment reproduces the classical RL equation (6), i.e.: with both and equals to zero. A total of 100 agents are used, with a learning rate ( ) set to 0.2. The payoff matrix used for the experiment is shown in Table 2 . Action is clearly favored by the matrix, and coordination, in the form of performing the same action, is rewarded, while miscoordination punished.
In the first experiment, 50 agents start performing action and 50 agents start performing action . The results are depicted in figure 3 ; convergence is subtle and stable, once the equilibrium is reached.
In the second experiment, a small bias towards action is introduced for fifty agents ( = 0.1), while the payoff matrix remains the same as in previous experiment. Agents do not have a bias, but all start playing action ; this will be different in the following experiments, where unbiased agents will start performing a random action. The results are quite interesting, and depicted in figure 4. Even if action is clearly favored by the payoff matrix, after taking an initial lead in agents' preferences, all the population moves towards action . This is due to the resilience of biased agents in changing their mind; doing this way, the other 50 non-biased agents find more and more partners performing action , and thus, if they perform they get a negative payoff. In this way, in order to gain something, since they are not biased, they are forced to move towards the sub-optimal action , preferred by the biased agents. In order to give a social explanation of this, we can think to the fact that often the wiser persons adapt themselves to the more obstinate ones, when they necessarily have to deal with them, even if the outcome is not the optimal one, just not to lose more. This is particular evident when the wiser persons are the minority, or, as in our case, in an equal number. At this point we wonder how many "rotten apples" (i.e.: biased agents) are needed to ruin the entire barrel (i.e.: turn away all the agents from the optimal convergence), given the same payoff matrix. With a series of ceteris paribus experiments, we found the critical division to be 20/80; the results are shown in figure 5 . The unbiased agents now start by performing a random action, in order to probe for the best move, and then adapt themselves on the basis of their perceptions. On the other hand, the biased agents start by performing action . In this way the agents performing , both biased and un-biased ones, when they meet an agent performing get a negative bias. Even if the optimal combination would be , once again the equilibrium is found on the suboptimal joint action, which is . Till now the advantage of performing join action over was evident (payoff 2 vs 1) but not huge; in the next experiment, a new payoff matrix is used, in the joint action is rewarded 3, instead of 2. The purpose is investigating how much the previous threshold would increase under these hypotheses. The empirical finding is 25/75, and the convergence is again extremely fast, and much similar to the previous experiment. Even a bigger advantage for the optimal action is soon nullified by the presence of just 25% biased agents, when penalty for miscoordination exists. This explains why sometimes suboptimal actions (or non-best products) become the most spread and common. In the real world, marketing could be able to bias a part of the population, and a good distribution or other politics for the suboptimal product/service could act as a penalty for unbiased players when interacting with biased ones. The following experiment investigates the case with no penalty for miscoordination. To explore the differences with experiment 1, twenty biased agents were employed, out of 100. The results are shown in figure 6. As it's evident, now the results are less extreme, in the sense that a part of the agents succeed in performing the optimal action; though, many unbiased agents are dragged along by the biased ones, to the suboptimal action. Numerically speaking, about 50% of unbiased agents become supporter of the suboptimal action, even if the biased agents are a small part of the population (20%).
This shows that penalty for miscoordination is important, but not crucial, for averting the majority of the population from the best possible choice.
FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
While individual preferences are very important as a bias factor for learning and action selection, when dealing with social systems, in which many entities operate at the same time and are usually connected over a network, other factors should be kept into consideration. In particular, the preferences of other individuals with which a specific agent is in touch can affect her choices, modifying the perception mechanism described in equation 6. Once again, if the goal is that of representing agents mimicking human behaviour, then it's not realistic to consider perfect perception of the payoffs deriving from past actions. Besides, Fragaszy and Visalberghi (2001) agree that socially-biased learning is widespread in the animal kingdom and important in behavioural biology and evolution. It's important to distinguish between imitation and socially biased learning; while the former is limited to de facto imitating the behaviour of another individual (possible with some minor changes), the second is referred to modifying the possessed behaviour after the observation of others' behaviours. While imitation is most passive and mechanical, social learning supposes a form of intelligence in selecting how to modify the past behaviour, taking into account others' experience. Box (1984) defines socially biased learning as: a change in behaviour contingent upon a change in cognitive state associated with experience that is aided by exposure to the activities of social companions. The first part of this is already taken care by RL methods (equation 6) and by the EBL proposed in the previous sections. What is still lacking is the bias coming from social companions, i.e.: other agents coexisting in the same environment. In future works a reputational based approach will be used, to embed a form of social bias into the agents. This will keep into consideration the payoffs deriving from other agents' actions, weighted by agents' individual reputations, acting as a bias for the equation defining the RL strategy, along with EBL.
CONCLUSIONS
In this work a formal method for action selection is introduced: it's based on one step QL algorithm (equation 6), but it takes into account individual preference for one or more actions. This method is designed to be used in simulation of social systems employing MAS, where many entities interact in the same environment and must take some actions at each time-step. In particular, traditional methods do not take into account human factor, in the form of personal inclination towards different strategies, and consider the agents as totally rational and able to modify their behaviour based on an analytical payoff function derived from the performed actions.
Ego biased learning is formally presented in the most simple case, in which only two categories of agents are involved, and only two actions are possible. That's to show the basic equations and explore the results, when varying the parameters.
After that, some general cases are faced and equations are supplied, where an arbitrary number of agents' categories is taken into account, along with an equally discretionary number of actions. There can be many sub-cases for this situations, e.g.: one action is preferred, and the others are disadvantaged, or an agent has the same bias towards more actions, or in the most general situation, each action can have a positive or negative bias, for an agent.
Some simulations are run, and the results are studied, showing how, even a small part of the population, with a negligible bias towards a particular action, can affect the convergence of a RL algorithm. In particular, if miscoordination is punished, after few steps all the agents converge on the suboptimal action, which is the one preferred by the biased agents. With no penalty for miscoordination, things are less radical, but once again many non-biased agents (even if not all of them) converge to the suboptimal action. This shows how personal biases are important in social systems, where agents must coordinate or interact.
